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Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes:
Measuring the Effects of Consumer
Bankruptcy Protection
Will Dobbie
“The Bankruptcy Act is . . . of public as well as private
interest, in that it gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor
. . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of
pre-existing debt.” (Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234
[1934])
In 2010, 1.5 million Americans filed for over $450 billion in debt relief through the consumer bankruptcy system.
U.S. households receive more resources through the bankruptcy system than through Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families and all state unemployment insurance programs
combined (Lefgren, McIntyre, and Miller 2010), with nearly
1 in 10 American households having filed for bankruptcy at
some point (Stavins 2000). The U.S. bankruptcy system is
also among the most generous in the world, allowing debtors
to choose between Chapter 7, which provides debt relief and
protection from wage garnishment in exchange for a debtor’s
nonexempt assets, and Chapter 13, which adds the protection
of most assets in exchange for a partial repayment of debt.
Despite providing billions in debt relief each year, it is not
clear how bankruptcy protection impacts debtors. In theory,
bankruptcy protection increases an individual’s incentive to
work and prevents any sharp drops in consumption that may
have important long-term consequences, such as becoming sick through lack of medical care or losing one’s home
through foreclosure. Yet, in practice, households work about
the same number of hours (Han and Li 2007), accumulate
less wealth (Han and Li 2011), and have less access to
credit (Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump, and Montoriol-Garriga
2009) after receiving bankruptcy protection, leading some to
conclude that the benefits of debt relief have been overstated
(Porter and Thorne 2006). The lack of demonstrable benefits,
combined with a rapid increase in the number of bankruptcy
filings, led Congress to enact new barriers to filing in the
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.
Empirically estimating the impact of bankruptcy protection has been complicated by two important issues. First,
there is little information on the long-term outcomes of
most bankruptcy filers. Bankruptcy filers are not tracked in
a systematic way after filing, and data sets such as the PSID
and NLSY include only a few hundred bankrupt households.
Second, selection and endogeneity problems bias most
comparisons. Bankruptcy filers are likely to have had worse
outcomes even before filing, biasing cross-sectional compari-
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sons, and most proximate causes of bankruptcy such as job
loss and health shocks also impact later outcomes, biasing
within-individual comparisons.
In this dissertation, we use a new data set linking 500,000
bankruptcy filings with administrative tax records from the
Social Security Administration and administrative foreclosure records to estimate the causal effect of Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection on subsequent earnings, mortality, and
home foreclosures. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact
that most U.S. bankruptcy courts use a blind rotation system
to assign cases to judges, effectively randomizing filers to
judges within each court. Moreover, while there are uniform
criteria by which a judge may dismiss a bankruptcy filing,
there is significant variation in the interpretation of these
criteria across judges (Chang and Schoar 2008; Norberg
and Compo 2007; Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook 1994).
As a result, otherwise identical filers are assigned to judges
with substantially different rates of granting bankruptcy
protection.1
Using these differences in judge discharge rates as an
instrumental variable for bankruptcy protection, we are able
to identify the ex post impact of Chapter 13 on the marginal
recipient of protection filers whose bankruptcy decisions
are altered by the judge assignment due to disagreement on
whether or not they should receive bankruptcy protection.
The identified parameter holds fixed any ex ante impacts
of bankruptcy, such as overborrowing, moral hazard in the
workplace (White 2011), entrepreneurial risk-taking (Armour
and Cumming 2008; Fan and White 2003), or the crowding out of formal insurance (Mahoney 2010). Our empirical
strategy is therefore similar to Kling (2006), who uses the
random assignment of judges to estimate the ex post impact
of sentence length on earnings, and subsequent research estimating the ex post effects of foster care (Doyle 2007, 2008),
corporate bankruptcy (Chang and Schoar 2008), temporaryhelp employment (Autor and Houseman 2010), and Disability Insurance (French and Song 2011, Maestas, Mullen, and
Strand forthcoming).
We find compelling evidence that Chapter 13 bankruptcy
protection benefits debtors. Over the first five postfiling
years, Chapter 13 protection increases the marginal recipient’s annual earnings by $6,288, a 27.5 percent increase from
the prefiling mean. Employment increases by 3.3 percentage points over the same time period, a 4.1 percent increase.
Five-year mortality decreases by 1.1 percentage points, a
27.5 percent decrease from the dismissed filer mean, and
five-year home foreclosure rates decrease by 8.3 percentage
points.
Next, the dissertation explores two possible mechanisms
through which bankruptcy protection may benefit debtors.
First, we exploit within- and across-state variation in wage
garnishment to assess the importance of the Chapter 13 provision protecting wages from garnishment. We find that the
impact of Chapter 13 is sharply increasing in the marginal

1

garnishment rate, with an implied earnings elasticity with
respect to garnishment of 2.02. These results are consistent
with the idea that bankruptcy protection increases the incentive to work by lowering the effective marginal tax rate on
earnings. Second, we use information from firm EINs to estimate the impact of Chapter 13 on economic stability. We find
that the marginal recipient of Chapter 13 is 25.4 percentage
points more likely to work in his or her prefiling job, 25.2
percentage points more likely to work in the same industry,
and 19.3 percentage points more likely to work in the same
state, with larger impacts for filers facing higher marginal
garnishment rates. These results suggest that Chapter 13
increases economic stability by reducing both foreclosurerelated moves and moves meant to evade creditors seeking
repayment.
The dissertation concludes by considering our results in
light of a stylized general equilibrium model of the credit
market. Analyses of the consumer bankruptcy system have
typically focused on changes to consumption smoothing and borrowing costs, largely ignoring the relationship
between bankruptcy and earnings estimated in this paper
(e.g., Athreya 2002; Chatterjee and Gordon forthcoming; Li
and Sarte 2006; Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt 2007). As a
result, the existing literature is likely to have understated the
potential benefits of the consumer bankruptcy system. Using
our reduced form estimates to calibrate a stylized extension
of these models, we find that the benefits of bankruptcy are
nearly 20 times larger when bankruptcy is allowed to impact
earnings.

Consumer Bankruptcy in the United States
Bankruptcy is the legal process to resolve unpaid debts. In
the United States, individual debtors are allowed to choose
between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection.
Under Chapter 7, debtors forfeit all nonexempt assets in
exchange for a discharge of eligible debts and protection
from future wage garnishment. Nearly all unsecured debts
are eligible for discharge under Chapter 7, including credit
card debt, installment loans, medical debt, unpaid rent and
utility bills, tort judgments, and business debt. Student loans,
child support obligations, and debts incurred by fraud cannot
be discharged under Chapter 7, and secured debts such as
mortgages, home equity loans, and automobile loans can
only be discharged if debtors give up the collateral.
Under Chapter 13, filers propose a 3–5-year plan to repay
part of their unsecured debt in exchange for a discharge of
the remaining unsecured debt, protection from future wage
garnishment, and the protection of most assets. For example,
Chapter 13 allows debtors to retain assets pledged as collateral by including the collateral amount in the repayment
plan. Chapter 13 also allows debtors to avoid home foreclosure by including any mortgage arrears in the repayment
plan, with the original mortgage reinstated after completion
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of the plan. Seventy percent of Chapter 13 filers report that
avoiding foreclosure is their principal reason for choosing
to file under Chapter 13 (Porter 2011), with 71 percent of
filers including mortgage arrears in their repayment plans.
In comparison, 41 percent of filers include car loans in their
repayment plan, 38 percent include priority debt, and 0.5 percent include student loans (White and Zhu 2010).
Under either chapter, a randomly assigned bankruptcy
judge decides any and all matters connected to a case,
including whether or not to dismiss a filing. The most
common reason a filing is dismissed is that it constitutes
a “substantial abuse” of the bankruptcy process, typically
meaning that a debtor being able to repay his or her debts
without bankruptcy protection. Other common reasons for
dismissal include a filing that is missing important information, an infeasible repayment plan, or a repayment plan being
too small (Hynes 2004).
Creditors have a number of options to collect unpaid
debts if a filing is dismissed, including collection letters or
phone calls, in-person visits at home or work, or seizing
assets through a court order (Dawsey, Hynes, and Ausubel
2009). Creditors may also collect unpaid debts by obtaining
a wage garnishment order from the state court. Federal law
restricts the weekly total of most garnishments to 25 percent
of disposable earnings. If debtors have weekly earnings less
than 40 times the minimum wage, creditors may only garnish
disposable earnings minus 30 times the federal minimum
wage. Wages cannot be garnished when debtors earn less
than 30 times the minimum wage. Debtors can make all of
these collection efforts more difficult by ignoring collection
letters and calls, changing their telephone numbers, or moving without leaving a forwarding address. Debtors can also
leave the formal banking system to hide their assets from
seizure, change jobs to force creditors to reinstate a garnishment order, or work less so that their earnings are not subject
to garnishment.

Model and Research Design
In this section, we develop a stylized bankruptcy and
labor supply model to formalize our estimation strategy and
identifying assumptions. We simplify the model by assuming a single debt relief program and predetermined debt.
Our model is therefore unable to shed light on any ex ante
impacts of bankruptcy or the interplay between Chapter 7
and Chapter 13.
Setup. Individuals are endowed with identical debts D,
and an idiosyncratic disutility of work θ that captures differ–
ences in ability across individuals. We assume that θ ~ [0, θ ],
is known by the individual, but only partially observable to
the bankruptcy court.
In the first period of the model, individuals choose
whether or not to file for bankruptcy protection at cost F that
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Formally, we estimate the causal impact of receiving
bankruptcy protection through a two-stage least squares
regression using judge leniency as an instrumental variable
for bankruptcy protection. The second-stage estimating equais i + γBankruptcyi + εit
yit = α + αcttion
+ βX

is monotonic across filers. In the dissertation, we show that
each of these assumptions is likely to be satisfied.

Main Results
Labor Supply

Panels A and B in Figure 2 present two-stage least squares
results measuring the causal impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on earnings and employment. The sample
consists of first time filers in the 31 courts that randomly
where i denotes individuals;θ t is the year of observation;
γ
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protection has a large and precisely estimated impact on
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postfiling earnings. Filers granted Chapter 13 protection from
ability of receiving bankruptcy protection.
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Intthis sample, Chapter 13 protection increases the marginal
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recipient’s annual earnings by $6,619 in the sixth through
c
j denotes individuals, c denotes
t
where i again
courts, j is the
tenth postfiling years. These results suggest that the impact
assigned judge, t is the year
ncjtof observation, Bi is an indicaof bankruptcy protection is persistent after the completion of
tor for receiving bankruptcy protection,
the number
t ncjt Zisijct
the repayment plan.
of cases seen by a judge in year t, and nct is the number of
As an additional check of our identification strategy, Panel
cases seen by a court in year t. This leave-one-out proceA
in
Figure 2 also plots two-stage least squares estimates for
dure, essentially
a
reduced-form
version
of
the
Jackknife
IV
Zijct
approach, purges the mechanical correlation between a filer’s five prefiling years. Consistent with our identifying assumptions discussed above, there is no systematic relationship
own outcomes and our measure of judge leniency.
between bankruptcy protection and earnings in the prefiling
Using our reduced form measure of judge leniency Zijct
years, with the estimated coefficients being economically and
as an instrument for bankruptcy protection, the identified
statistically insignificant.
two-stage least squares parameter from equation measures
Panel B in Figure 2 presents results for employment,
the causal impact of Chapter 13 protection for the marginal
defined as nonzero earnings in a calendar year. Over the first
recipient. Our estimates therefore measure the local averfive postfiling years, Chapter 13 increases employment by
age treatment effect for filers whose bankruptcy outcome is
3.4 percentage points, a 4.1 percent increase from the basealtered by judge assignment due to disagreement on whether
line mean. The probability of being employed is also higher
they should receive bankruptcy protection.
in the sixth through tenth postfiling years, but the point
The three conditions necessary to interpret our two-stage
estimates are too imprecisely estimated to draw definitive
least squares estimates as the causal impact of bankruptcy
conclusions.
protection are 1) that judge assignment is associated with
Additional analyses show that Chapter 13 protection
bankruptcy protection, 2) that judge assignment only impacts
has a larger impact on filers with above median earnings,
debtor outcomes through the probability of receiving bankand filers who are between 25 and 60 years old at the time
ruptcy protection, and 3) that the impact of judge assignZijct
of filing. Chapter 13 increases annual earnings by $7,905
ment on the probability of receiving bankruptcy protection
t

1) yit = α +αct + ßXi γ+ γBankruptcyi +εit

4

Zijct
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Figure 2 Impact of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Protection
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NOTE: These figures plot two-stage least squares results of the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on earnings, employment,
cumulative mortality, and home foreclosure. The earnings and mortality sample includes all first-time filings between 1992 and 2005 in
courts that randomly assign cases to judges. The foreclosure sample includes the subset of those filings originating in county-by-year bins
with foreclosure data coverage. We instrument for bankruptcy protection using judge leniency and control for gender, race, a quartic in age,
baseline employment, baseline earnings, and office by month-of-filing fixed effects. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals
from standard errors clustered at the court level. Year 0 indicates the year a debtor files for bankruptcy protection. Earnings are winsorized
at the top and bottom 1 percent. Employment is an indicator for nonzero wage earnings on the W-2. All monetary values are expressed in
real 2000 dollars. Mortality is an indicator for being deceased in the indicated year using information from the Death Master File. Foreclosure is an indicator for a filer’s home receiving a notice of default, receiving a notice of transfer or sale, or being transferred to a real
estate owner or a guarantor.

for filers with above median earnings, compared to only
$3,859 for filers with below median earnings. The impact of
Chapter 13 protection on employment is also 1.5 percentage
points higher for filers with above median baseline earnings.
Chapter 13 appears to have no impact on the earnings of filers older than 60, likely because these filers have already left
the labor market. In contrast, Chapter 13 increases the annual
2013 Dissertation Summaries

earnings of filers who are between 25 and 40 years old by
$8,639, and the annual earnings of filers who are between
40 and 60 years old by $7,127. Bankruptcy protection also
increases annual earnings somewhat more for filers who are
female and nonwhite, though the differences are not economically or statistically significant.
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Mortality
Panel C in Figure 2 presents two-stage least squares
results measuring the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on mortality. Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection significantly lowers mortality in the first five years after filing.
Chapter 13 protection decreases one-year mortality for the
marginal recipient by a statistically insignificant 0.3 percentage points, and two-year mortality by a statistically significant 1.3 percentage points. Five-year mortality, the longest
time period available for our entire sample, is 1.1 percentage
points lower, a 27.5 percent decrease from the control mean
of 4.0 percentage points. These estimates imply an increase
of 0.04 in the number of years alive over the first five postfiling years. In a sample of individuals filing between 1992
and 2000, Chapter 13 protection decreases 10-year mortality
by a statistically insignificant 2.1 percentage points.
To put the magnitude of these estimates in context, it is
helpful to consider the effects of job loss the most commonly
reported cause of bankruptcy on mortality. In a sample of
Pennsylvania workers, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) find
that job displacement increases short-run mortality by 50 to
100 percent, and long-run mortality by 10 to 15 percent. In
the specification closest to ours, they find that job displacement increases five-year mortality by 1.2 percentage points.
One interpretation of our estimates is therefore that bankruptcy protection can offset much of the increased mortality
risk from financial distress caused by events such as job loss.

Home Foreclosure
Figure 2D presents two-stage least squares results measuring the impact of Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on home
foreclosure. The sample includes individuals filing in countyby-year combinations in the DataQuick data described in the
full dissertation.
Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection significantly lowers the
probability of home foreclosure. In the raw data, five-year
foreclosure rates are less than 0.5 percent for filers receiving
bankruptcy protection, compared to 4.7 percent for dismissed
filers. This implies that approximately onefifth of home owners whose filings are dismissed experience home foreclosure
within the first five postfiling years. In the two-stage least
squares estimates, Chapter 13 decreases foreclosure by 4.2
percentage points in the first postfiling year, and by 6.3
percentage points in the second postfiling year. Foreclosure
rates are 8.3 percentage points lower five years after filing,
a 176 percent decrease from the dismissed filer mean. Note
that the dismissed filer mean is not the counterfactual mean,
so decreases of more than 100 percent are possible. Taken at
face value, this pattern of results suggests that filers receiving
bankruptcy protection were more likely to experience home
foreclosure than dismissed filers, perhaps because bank-
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ruptcy judges are more likely to grant bankruptcy to filers at
particular risk of foreclosure.
In additional results, we show that bankruptcy protection
also significantly decreases voluntary and short home sales.
Distress sales, which include both foreclosures and short
sales, are 11.3 percentage points lower after five years. Home
sales, which include all types of housing transactions, are
16.2 percentage points lower after five years.

Potential Channels
Why are there such large benefits of receiving bankruptcy
protection? In this section of the dissertation, we explore two
potentially relevant explanations. First, we exploit withinand across-state variation in wage garnishment to assess the
importance of the Chapter 13 provision protecting wages
from garnishment. We find that the impact of Chapter 13 is
sharply increasing in the marginal garnishment rate, with an
implied earnings elasticity with respect to garnishment of
2.02. These results are consistent with the idea that bankruptcy protection increases the incentive to work by lowering
the effective marginal tax rate on earnings.
Second, we use information from firm EINs to estimate
the impact of Chapter 13 on economic stability. We find that
marginal recipient of Chapter 13 is 25.4 percentage points
more likely to work in his or her prefiling job, 25.2 percentage points more likely to work in the same industry, and 19.3
percentage points more likely to work in the same state, with
larger impacts for filers facing higher marginal garnishment
rates. These results suggest that Chapter 13 increases economic stability by reducing both foreclosure-related moves
and moves meant to evade creditors seeking repayment.

Discussion
The results we have presented have potentially important
implications for the modeling of the consumer bankruptcy
system. The evaluation of consumer bankruptcy laws has
typically involved an assessment of two second-order effects,
where bankruptcy benefits individuals by providing partial
insurance against consumption uncertainty at the cost of
higher interest rates that make life-cycle smoothing more
difficult (e.g., Athreya 2002; Chatterjee and Gordon forthcoming; Li and Sarte 2006; Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
2007). Importantly, the typical model does not account for
the firstorder relationship between bankruptcy and labor supply estimated in this paper. As a result, the existing literature
is likely to have understated the potential benefits of the
consumer bankruptcy system.
To see this, it is helpful to consider our earnings result
in light of a stylized extension of the heterogeneous agent
lifecycle model of Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007).
We extend the Livshits, MacGee, andTertilt (2007) model
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by assuming that default outside of the bankruptcy system
lowers household productivity. This assumption is meant
to capture in a transparent way the earnings loss observed
among dismissed filers in our data. Holding all other parameters fixed, bankruptcy is over 10 times more beneficial when
default lowers household productivity by 10 percent, and
nearly 20 times more beneficial when default lowers household productivity by 25 percent. To put these magnitudes in
perspective, the model suggests that bankruptcy is six times
more beneficial when the frequency of expense shocks is
doubled, and nearly 40 times more beneficial when the size
of expense shocks is doubled (Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt
2007).
The results of this stylized exercise suggest that individual
debt relief is likely to be welfare-improving. This conclusion
differs substantially from a number of prominent papers,
such as Athreya (2002) and Chatterjee and Gordon (forthcoming), that abstract away from the effects of bankruptcy
on earnings. Even models that suggest debt relief is welfareimproving, such as Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007),
likely understate the benefits of the consumer bankruptcy
system by assuming little to no impact of bankruptcy on
labor supply. Incorporating our health and home foreclosure
results into the model would only further strengthen this
conclusion.

The main limitation of our analysis is that we are not able
to estimate the impact of bankruptcy laws on ex ante borrowing costs or behavior. There may also be important ex post
impacts of bankruptcy protection on outcomes such as credit
availability that we are unable to measure with our data.
Finally, our analysis has focused on Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
which makes up about 30 percent of all bankruptcy filings.
This paper should therefore be viewed as a first step toward
characterizing the impact of consumer bankruptcy protection
on debtors.

Conclusion
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Athreya, Kartik. 2002. “Welfare Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.” Journal of Monetary Economics 49(8): 1567–1595.
Autor, David, and Susan Houseman. 2010. “Do TemporaryHelp Jobs Improve Labor Market Outcomes for LowSkilled Workers? Evidence from “Work First.” American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2(3): 96–128.
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Eggertsson, Gauti, and Paul Krugman. 2012. “Debt, Dele-

In this paper, we estimate the impact of Chapter 13
bankruptcy protection on subsequent labor supply, mortality,
and home foreclosure. We find that Chapter 13 increases the
marginal recipient’s annual earnings in the first five postfiling years by $6,288, a 27.5 percent increase. Employment
increases by 3.3 percentage points over the same time period,
a 4.1 percent increase. Five-year mortality is 1.1 percentage
points lower, a 27.5 percent decrease, with five-year foreclosure rates falling by 8.3 percentage points. There is evidence
consistent with the results being driven by increased incentive to work and increased economic stability following the
receipt of bankruptcy protection.
Our results provide new evidence on the ex post benefits of debt relief. These results are particularly important
in light of the on-going debate surrounding the use of debt
relief and mortgage modification to stimulate the economy.
Work by Mulligan (2008), Hall (2011), and Eggertsson and
Krugman (forthcoming) suggests that household borrowing
constraints can help explain the severity of the recession,
while Mian and Sufi (2012) show that regional differences
in debt overhang can explain differences in unemployment.
Our estimates also suggest that the restrictions on bankruptcy
filing introduced by the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act may have important adverse
consequences on the economy.
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Notes
1.

2.

We are unable to estimate the impact of Chapter 7 bankruptcy
protection using judge assignment, as there is relatively little
variation in the treatment of Chapter 7 cases. We use an event
study design to show that filers granted protection under Chapter 7 earn $1,048 more each year, are 6.3 percentage points
more likely to be employed, and are 1.45 percentage points less
likely to be deceased after five years.
The decision problem can also be expressed as one in which
estimates of θ are unbiased, but judges use different cutoff
^
values θ Bj due to pro-creditor or pro-debtor preferences. In this
^
^
scenario, judge j grants a filing if θi + ηij > θB + σj, where σj
represents judge-specific differences in the optimal cutoff.

References

7

veraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-Minsky-Koo
Approach.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(3):
1469–1513.
Fan, Wei, and Michelle White. 2003. “Personal Bankruptcy
and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity.” Journal of Law
and Economics 46(2): 543–567.
French, Eric, and Jae Song. 2011. “The Effect of Disability
Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago Working Paper WP-2009-05. Chicago:
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Hall, Robert. 2011. “The Long Slump.” American Economic
Review 101(2): 431–469.
Han, Song, and Wenli Li. 2007. “Fresh Start of Head Start?
The Effect of Filing for Personal Bankruptcy on Labor
Supply.” Journal of Financial Services Research 31(2):
132–152.
———. 2011. “Household Borrowing after Personal Bankruptcy.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 43(2-3):
491–517.
Hynes, Richard. 2004. “Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?”
Alabama Law Review 56(1): 121–179.
Kling, Jeffrey. 2006. “Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings.” American Economic Review 96(3):
863–876.
Lefgren, Lars, Frank McIntyre, and Michelle Miller. 2010.
“Chapter 7 or 13: Are Client or Lawyer Interests Paramount?” B.E. Journal of Economic Policy and Analysis
10(1): Article 82.
Li, Wenli, and Pierre-Daniel Sarte. 2006. “U.S. Consumer
Bankruptcy Choice: The Importance of General Equilibrium Effects.” Journal of Monetary Economics 53(3):
613–631.
Livshits, Igor, James MacGee, and Michele Tertilt. 2007.
“Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start.” American Economic Review 97(1): 402–418.
Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen, and Alexander Strand.
2013. “Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage
Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal
Effects of SSDI Receipt.” American Economic Review
103(5): 1797–1829.
Mian, Atif, and Amir Sufi. 2012. “What Explains High
Unemployment? The Aggregate Demand Channel.” NBER
Working Paper No. 17830. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Development.
Mulligan, Casey. 2008. “A Depressing Scenario: Mortgage
Debt Becomes Unemployment Insurance.” NBER Working Paper No. 14541. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Development.
Norberg, Scott, and Nadja Compo. 2007. “Report on an
Empirical Study of District Variations, and the Roles of
Judges, Trustees and Debtor’s Attorneys in Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Cases.” American Bankruptcy Law Journal
81(431): 101–158.

8

Porter, Katherine. 2011. “The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bankruptcy Outcomes.” Texas Law Review
90(103): 104–162.
Porter, Katherine, and Deborah Thorne. 2006. “The Failure
of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start.” Cornell Law Review 92(1):
67–128.
Stains, Joanna. 2000. “Credit Card Borrowing, Delinquency,
and Personal Bankruptcy.” New England Economic Review
(July): 15–30.
Sullivan, Teresa, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook. 1994.
“The Persistence of Local LegalCulture: Twenty Years of
Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts.” Harvard
Journal of Law and Public Policy 17(3): 801–865.
———. 2000. The Fragile Middle Class. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
White, Michelle. 2011. “Corporate and Personal Bankruptcy
Law.” NBER Working Paper No.17237. Cambridge, MA:
National Bureau of Economic Development.
White, Michelle, and Ning Zhu. 2010. “Saving Your Home
in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy.” Journal of Legal Studies 39(1):
33–61

2013 Dissertation Summaries

